Dishonest mistakes

The understanding is supposed to be that the troops serve on whatever mission is ordered, and the government doesn’t order them to risk their lives for a political folly.

– Unknown

On May 11 Paul Waldman had a piece in The American Prospect, Should We Relitigate the Iraq War in the 2016 Campaign? You Bet We Should.   In it he offered a list of questions for 2016 presidential candidates.  I noted it at the time.  Waldman’s questions force the issue of how the candidate would act on what they do know and how they would deal with uncertainty.   His questions are forward-looking – and that should be a good thing.  Unfortunately, we don’t appear to be ready for it.  If we were then statements to the effect of “knowing what we know now…” re Iraq would be immediately called out as bullshit by everyone within earshot.  They are not.  Today James Fallows summed up concisely why saying “knowing what we know now…” is bullshit:

  • The “knowing what we know” question presumes that the Bush Administration and the U.S. public were in the role of impartial jurors, or good-faith strategic decision-makers, who while carefully weighing the evidence were (unfortunately) pushed toward a decision to invade, because the best-available information at the time indicated that there was an imminent WMD threat.
  • That view is entirely false.
  • The war was going to happen. The WMD claims were the result of the need to find a case for the war, rather than the other way around.

He then gets into the details at length.

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Looking back on the Iraq War: Questions for 2016 presidential candidates

Paul Waldman poses questions for 2016 presidential candidates:

  1. How do [you] view the extraordinary propaganda campaign the Bush administration launched to convince Americans to get behind the war?
  2. Does that make [you] want to be careful about how [your administration would] argue for [its] policy choices?
  3. Did Iraq change [your] perspective on American military action, particularly in the Middle East?
  4. What light [do the lessons learned from the war] shed on the reception the American military is likely to get the next time we invade someplace?
  5. What does it teach us about power vacuums and the challenges of nation-building?
  6. How [do the lessons learned from the war] inform [your] thinking on the prospect of military action in Syria and Iran specifically?
  7. Given the boatload of unintended consequences Iraq unleashed, how would [you], as president, go about making decisions on complex issues that are freighted with uncertainty?

Number 7 is of particular interest to me.   “If I knew then what I know now…” is all well and good but how will the candidate approach complex issues where there’s inherent uncertainty?  Do they acknowledge downside risk?  If so then how do they try to get a handle on it?

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Thought for the Day: 3 February 2015

It is a fact that some image analysts are superior to other image analysts because they:

  1. Understand the scientific principles better,
  2. Are more widely traveled and have seen many landscape objects and geographic areas, and/or
  3. They can synthesize scientific principles and real-world knowledge to reach logical and correct conclusions.

–  John Jensen

Scott Horton, The Guantanamo “Suicides”

The introductory paragraphs from Scott Horton’s investigative report in the March 2010 issue of Harper’s Magazine, “The Guantanamo “Suicides”:  A Camp Delta sergeant blows the whistle“:

When President Barack Obama took office last year, he promised to “restore the standards of due process and the core constitutional values that have made this country great.” Toward that end, the president issued an executive order declaring that the extra-constitutional prison camp at Guantánamo Naval Base “shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than one year from the date of this order.” Obama has failed to fulfill his promise. Some prisoners there are being charged with crimes, others released, but the date for closing the camp seems to recede steadily into the future. Furthermore, new evidence now emerging may entangle Obama’s young administration with crimes that occurred during the George W. Bush presidency, evidence that suggests the current administration failed to investigate seriously—and may even have continued—a cover-up of the possible homicides of three prisoners at Guantánamo in 2006.

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Seminar: “Why is it so Hard to Talk about War? Bridging the Civilian-Military Divide”

An upcoming seminar where our Congressman-elect will be one of the speakers, “Why is it so Hard to Talk about War? Bridging the Civilian-Military Divide?”:

Herbert C. Kelman Seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Date:

Monday, December 8, 2014, 3:00pm to 4:30pm

See also: Herbert C. Kelman Seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2014–2015

Location:

CGIS South Building, 1730 Cambridge Street, Tsai Auditorium

“Why is it so Hard to Talk about War? Bridging the Civilian-Military Divide”

Speakers:

Susan Hackley,Managing Director, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School.

Seth Moulton,Congressman-elect, Massachusetts’ 6th district.

Contact:

Donna Hicks, dhicks@wcfia.harvard.edu

Senate report on the Bush administration’s use of “enhanced interrogation” practices

Robert Naiman in the Huffington Post:

“Time Is Running Out on the CIA Torture Report,” the National Journalreports:

Backroom negotiations over the release of a long-delayed Senate report on the George W. Bush administration’s use of so-called “enhanced interrogation” practices are again hitting a wall….
The Senate is set to adjourn in mid-December, but [Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Dianne] Feinstein can still hold off on submitting the report until the start of next year by obtaining a consent agreement that would allow her to file when Congress is not in session.  But the extension would only give Feinstein a few weeks of extra daylight. The current Senate will formally expire at noon on Jan. 3…. The continued fraying of negotiations has some suggesting that the White House might be intentionally stalling, in hopes that it can run out the clock on the report’s release, especially with Republicans slated to take over.

National Journal notes that outgoing Colorado Senator Mark Udall — no longer constrained even in theory by the perceived need to curry favor with power — is the last line of defense for Senate Democrats: he can declassify the Senate Intelligence Committee’s preferred version of the report by himself, by reading it into the Congressional Record, under the protection of the Constitution’s Speech or Debate clause.

More is at stake than establishing a public record on the CIA’s use of torture and its illegal attempts to hide its crimes from other executive branch officials and Congress, important though that is. The struggle over the release of the CIA torture report is a litmus test of the ability and willingness of Congress to conduct any meaningful oversight of the CIA at all.

One of the early indicators that the Obama was not going to impress was his statement that he would not aggressively investigate potential war crimes by the previous administration.*  Related links:

* Gen. Taguba was instructed to retire in 2006, less than two years after the release of The Taguba Report but before he publicly accused the Bush Administration of war crimes.

Daniel Bolger, The Truth About the Wars

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Daniel Bolger in the NY Times, The Truth About the Wars:

As a senior commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, I lost 80 soldiers. Despite their sacrifices, and those of thousands more, all we have to show for it are two failed wars. This fact eats at me every day, and Veterans Day is tougher than most.

As veterans, we tell ourselves it was all worth it. The grim butchery of war hovers out of sight and out of mind, an unwelcome guest at the dignified ceremonies. Instead, we talk of devotion to duty and noble sacrifice. We salute the soldiers at Omaha Beach, the sailors at Leyte Gulf, the airmen in the skies over Berlin and the Marines at the Chosin Reservoir, and we’re not wrong to do so. The military thrives on tales of valor. In our volunteer armed forces, such stirring examples keep bringing young men and women through the recruiters’ door. As we used to say in the First Cavalry Division, they want to “live the legend.” In the military, we love our legends.

Here’s a legend that’s going around these days. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and toppled a dictator. We botched the follow-through, and a vicious insurgency erupted. Four years later, we surged in fresh troops, adopted improved counterinsurgency tactics and won the war. And then dithering American politicians squandered the gains. It’s a compelling story. But it’s just that — a story.

The surge in Iraq did not “win” anything. It bought time. It allowed us to kill some more bad guys and feel better about ourselves. But in the end, shackled to a corrupt, sectarian government in Baghdad and hobbled by our fellow Americans’ unwillingness to commit to a fight lasting decades, the surge just forestalled today’s stalemate. Like a handful of aspirin gobbled by a fevered patient, the surge cooled the symptoms. But the underlying disease didn’t go away. The remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Sunni insurgents we battled for more than eight years simply re-emerged this year as the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.

The surge legend is soothing, especially for military commanders like me. We can convince ourselves that we did our part, and a few more diplomats or civilian leaders should have done theirs. Similar myths no doubt comforted Americans who fought under the command of Robert E. Lee in the Civil War or William C. Westmoreland in Vietnam. But as a three-star general who spent four years trying to win this thing — and failing — I now know better.

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On the importance of having a good decontamination protocol and executing it properly

This post is inspired by the two nurses, Nina Pham and Amber Vinson, who contracted Ebola virus after treating Thomas Eric Duncan at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital.  See the timeline of events surrounding Duncan’s diagnosis and treatment here.

I was somewhat surprised – and moderately alarmed – when Nina Pham was diagnosed last weekend.  That Amber Vinson also contracted Ebola is also alarming but as we learn more about how the hospital treated Duncan it’s not a huge surprise.  When Pham’s diagnosis was announce, while the possibility of Ebola having mutated and “gone mobile” was scary it also seemed remote.   More likely it seemed to me was that the nurses either didn’t have good personal protective equipment (PPE) or that the hospital didn’t have a good decontamination protocol for workers coming out of the hot zone.   It now appears that not only was the PPE used insufficient but that there was no decontamination protocol in place.   Given that, it doesn’t surprise me that several health care workers became ill.  When working with highly toxic materials or contagions good PPE is essential but if you don’t have a good decontamination protocol in place then you can easily expose yourself to the hazard when removing your PPE.  Good practice is to decontaminate your PPE before removing it.  My understanding is that bleach kills Ebola virus so, with the caveat that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing, my take is that proper decon of potentially-exposed health workers would involve spraying them down with bleach before they removed their PPE.  Continue reading

What’s wrong with this picture?

STLOUIS-ss-slide-M1BQ-superJumbo

I’ll start with easy one:  The police have automatic weapons.  (Or are the just semi?  Can’t tell.   Doesn’t matter anyway.)  In the civilized world riot police carry shields and truncheons.  Sending in a heavily-armed paramilitary force is not how responsible people act to de-escalate a tense situation.

A friend of mine once said, “There are a lot of assholes in the world.  The police are who we hire to be assholes back to them.”   While I don’t disagree with the sentiment in general, the devil is in the details. The militarization of the police is bad news.

F-35

David Axe, China, Russia Could Make U.S. Stealth Tech Obsolete:

It’s been a pillar of the U.S. military’s approach to high-tech warfare for decades. And now, it could become obsolete in just a few years.  Stealth technology — which today gives U.S. jets the nearly unparalleled ability to slip past hostile radar — may soon be unable to keep American aircraft cloaked….

“In recent years there has been speculation that ongoing advances in radar detection and tracking will, in the near future, obviate the ability of all-aspect, low-observable aircraft such as the B-2, F-22 and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, aka JSF, to survive inside denied airspace,” Watts writes, referring to America’s stealth bombers and fighter jets.

Stealth-killing advances include VHF and UHF radars being developed by Russia and China, and a “passive-detection” system devised by Czech researchers. The latter “uses radar, television, cellular phone and other available signals of opportunity reflected off stealthy aircraft to find and track them,” Watts explains.

These new detection systems could reverse a 30-year trend that has seen the U.S. Air Force gain an increasing advantage over enemy defenses….

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